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1 Introduction 
Modern fractional reserve banks can extend credit by issuing fiduci-
ary money – payment media not covered by base money. By this 
power, the banking system can potentially create large swings in the 
volumes of money and credit. A question of longstanding contro-
versy is this: Are money and credit cycles smaller when notes are 
supplied competitively by many banks, or when notes are supplied 
monopolistically by a central bank? Ever since the classical monetary 
debates of the 19th century, two views have stood opposed.  
In the "free banking view", note competition is the necessary 
remedy against credit expansion, since the interbank clearing mecha-
nism will then check the banks – banks that overexpand will suffer 
reserve losses in the clearing, which will rapidly force them to con-
tract. By contrast, a note monopolist (a central bank) is not con-
strained by the clearing mechanism, since its demand liabilities will 
be treated as base money by other banks and hence be used as re-
serves. Money and credit cycles will therefore be larger under note 
monopoly.  
In the opposite "currency view", the clearing mechanism cannot 
prevent overexpansion if the banks expand in concert, since no bank 
will then suffer net reserve losses in the clearing. The only automatic 
check against overexpansion is through leakage of reserves from the 
banking system – eventually, through an external drain, but also (in 
the case of note monopoly) arising from the public's demand for cur-
rency. Money and credit cycles will therefore be larger under note 
competition.1  
  Although the literature on this subject goes back over a century, it 
has until now been limited to theoretical speculation, with little or no 
empirical backing. This paper moves to fill the lacuna. In late 19th 
century Sweden, about 25 commercial banks called Enskilda banks 
issued notes, competing successfully with the Bank of Sweden, until 
this bank gained a note monopoly in 1904. This paper uses Swedish 
bank data from 1871–1938 to investigate how money and credit cycles 
                                                      
1 On the classical monetary debates see Smith (1936), White (1984), Schwartz 
(1992), Selgin and White (1994a). On the modern controversy see Goodhart 
(1988), Laidler (1992), Bordo and Schwartz (1996), and Selgin (2001).    2
were affected by the note monopolisation. Below, the effects of note 
monopolisation on the banking system's credit capacity are opera-
tionalised and quantified. What is the relative size of the clearing and 
leakage effects? This question is addressed by comparing multipliers 
of money and credit before and after monopolisation. It is shown that 
if the central bank's reserve ratio is larger than the reserve ratio of the 
commercial banks, and if the public's preferred currency-deposit ratio 
is sufficiently large, then the leakage effect may dominate the clearing 
effect, such that the money multiplier (and hence the banking sys-
tem's credit capacity) may decrease after monopolisation. This was 
the case when the Bank of Sweden gained a note monopoly in 1904. 
However, the credit capacity is also increased if the public’s preferred 
time-demand deposit ratio increases. This was shown to be the case, 
and this effect dominated the other effects such that the credit multi-
plier increased. Thus, the multiplier analysis yielded the predictions 
that money cycles should decrease post monopolisation, while credit 
cycles should increase. Confrontation with data yielded this very re-
sult. While money cycles became smaller, credit cycles became larger.  
2  Clearing vs. Leakage: the model  
Following Thunholm (1962, p. 239), the “credit capacity” of the bank-
ing system is governed by two items: the quantity of precautionary 
reserves that banks want to hold in relation to their (demand) liabili-
ties, and the size of the reserves leakage that arises from a credit ex-
pansion. Note monopolisation does two things. First, it withdraws 
the demand liabilities of the central bank from the range of the clear-
ing mechanism. Thereby the monetary base is expanded, which en-
hances the credit capacity of the banking system. Second, it trans-
forms  currency into base money. This installs leakage, which con-
strains the credit capacity of the banking system.  
If the credit capacity of the banking system can be measured by 
the money multiplier, it is possible to quantify the two effects. From 
standard textbooks (e.g. Dornbusch and Fischer 1990) we learn that 
the quantity of money M may be regarded as a function of the bank-
ing system’s money multiplier m times the quantity of base money B. 
With m fixed, an exogenous change in the quantity of base money   3
would cause a change in the quantity of money according to the ex-
pression:  
B m M ∆ ⋅ = ∆                  ( 1 )      
If the money multiplier were to decrease, then a given change in the 
quantity of base money would cause a smaller change in the quantity 
of money.  
This kind of mechanical multiplier approach has been criticised 
for being unrealistic as a description of the money supply process in 
the real world (Goodhart 1988). Although this critique may be valid, 
the purpose here is not to describe the money supply process, but to 
use the multiplier approach as a heuristic device to convey relative 
magnitudes of the clearing and leakage effects. For our purposes it is 
enough that the following premise is reasonably valid:  
Premise. A larger money (credit) multiplier is associated with lar-
ger swings in the volume of money (credit).  
We will now formalise and quantify these effects.  
The money multiplier 
In the competitive note banking system, all banks have the following 
schematic balance sheet:  
        Table 1 Balance sheet of bank in a note-competitive system 
Reserves  Notes 
Credit  Demand deposits 
  Time deposits 
 
The bold faced letters are used as abbreviations. The money stock M 
consists of notes and demand deposits. Denote inside money by I, 
that is, the money generated within the commercial banking system 
that are redeemable into base money B. In the competitive note bank-
ing system they are notes and demand deposits. The note-
competitive banking system is characterised by three conditions. First 
the money stock consists exclusively of inside money. Second and 
corollary, base money is exclusively used as reserves. Third, base 
money is gold G. This may be written in the following way:    4
Conditions of the note-competitive banking system: 
G R B
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Let us further define the following two ratios:  
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c = ,                  ( 4 )  
that is, the reserve ratio and the currency-deposit ratio. These are 
thought of as behavioural constants. All banks are asumed to have 
the same reserve ratio. To calculate the money-to-gold multiplier 
(MGM) we write:  
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.       (5) 
With note competition, the money-to-gold multiplier is equal to the 
money-to-base multiplier, or money multiplier for short. We see that 
the money multiplier is the inverse of the reserve ratio, a result previ-
ously derived by Selgin (1994). The currency-deposit ratio plays no 
role in the money multiplier of a note competitive banking system. 
An increase in the demand for notes relative to deposits would only 
exchange one type of inside money for another, with no effect on the 
total volume of money.  
As previously stated, note monopolisation does two things. By 
giving a central bank monopoly on notes, it withdraws the demand 
liabilities of the central bank from the range of the clearing mecha-
nism, wherefore notes and demand deposits of the central bank be-
come base money. The demand deposits of the central bank are equal 
to the reserves of the banks, R. Denote by Rcb and rcb the reserves and 
the reserve ratio of the central bank, where rcb = Rcb /B. Note monop-
oly is characterised by the following conditions:    5










             ( 6 )  
We then form the money-to-gold multiplier:  
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The MGM of note monopoly consists of two items: the money multi-
plier mnm of standard textbooks, divided by the central bank’s reserve 
ratio. In contrast to the case of note competition, the money multiplier 
of note monopoly is affected by a change in the currency-deposit ra-
tio. A larger c means more leakage of reserves, which forces the banks 
to contract. The money multiplier is therefore smaller. If MGM is to 
remain unchanged after note monopolisation, the following must 
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The central bank’s reserve ratio must be equal to the ratio between 
the money multipliers of note monopoly and note competition. Mo-
nopolisation installs leakage which lowers the money multiplier from  
mnc to mnm. But it also creates base expansion, equal to the inverse of 
rcb. Under what conditions will the leakage effect dominate the base 
expansion effect, such that the money-to-gold multiplier decreases? 
First, consider the case where the central bank’s reserve ratio is 
equal to that of all the other banks, that is, rcb = r. Assume further that 
the reserve ratios are not affected by monopolisation. From equations 
(8) and (9) we see that mnc must then be equal to one if the total mul-  6
tiplier is to remain unchanged, or smaller than one, if the total multi-








.                 ( 1 0 )  
The money multiplier can at most be equal to one, and this occurs if 
the banks hold 100 percent reserves, or if c is infinitely large. In prac-
tice this never happens. This yields the following propositions:  
Proposition (i): If the central bank’s reserve ratio is equal to the re-
serve ratio of the commercial banks, then the money-to-gold multi-
plier will increase post monopolisation. 
Proposition (ii): If the money-to-gold multiplier is to decrease post 
monopolisation, then the central bank’s reserve ratio must be higher 
than that of the commercial banks.  
Now consider the case when the central bank’s reserve ratio is differ-
ent from the reserve ratio of the commercial banks,  
b cb r r ≠ .                 ( 1 1 )  
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where α is the share of base money held by the commercial banks. 
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For the MGM to be unchanged after monopolisation, the following 
must hold:    7









= .            ( 1 6 )  
Compare (16) with (9). If g = 1, the reserve ratio of the central bank is 
equal to that of the commercial banks, and (16) reduces to (9). How-
ever, if g > 1, then the right-hand side could conceivably be smaller 
than rcb, and hence the total multiplier could decrease after monopoli-
sation. Whether that will happen depends on the values of α, g and c. 
The multiplier will decrease more the smaller α is, and the larger g 
and c are. Figure 18 shows the reserve ratios of the commercial banks 
and the Bank of Sweden, as well as the currency-deposit ratio, in 
1875–1938.  
Figure 1 Reserve and currency-deposit ratios, Sweden 1875–1938.  
 
 c  rb  rcb  α  g 
1897  0.84 0.16 0.32 0.52  2 
1904  0.78 0.19 0.32 0.34 1.68 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
The reserve ratio of the Bank of Sweden was highly stable. For the 
whole 60-year period 1878–1938, the mean reserve ratio was 0.35, 
with a standard deviation 0.037 (11 percent). It was not affected by 
note monopolisation. The reserve ratio of the commercial banks was 
0.16 at the beginning of the transition period, and 0.19 at the end of it. 
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Note monopoly  8
deposit ratio was about 0.8 at the time of transition. It declined dur-
ing WWI, to increase again to over 0.6 in the middle of the 1920s.  
Figure 1 shows that rcb was larger than rb both before and after 
monopolisation. The currency-deposit ratio also seems large, at least 
compared to contemporary figures. These two facts make it possible 
that the total multiplier decreased post monopolisation. In Figure 2, 
the values of rcb, rb, and g at the end of the transition period have been 
plugged into equation (9). α was set to 0.50. The graph shows the 
multiplier ratio mnc / mnm as a function of the currency-deposit ratio.  
Figure 2 Multiplier ratio as a function of the currency-deposit ratio 
 
Note: Parameters: rcb = 0.32, rb = 0.19, α = 0.50, g = 1.68.  
The multiplier ratio is a negative function of the currency-deposit 
ratio. A larger currency-deposit ratio results in a smaller note mo-
nopoly multiplier, and hence a smaller multiplier ratio. Figure 2 
marks a line for rcb = 0.32. If the multiplier ratio is below this line the 
total multiplier will decrease after monopolisation. For the parame-
ters rcb = 0.32, r b = 0.19, α = 0.50, and g = 1.68, the currency-deposit 
ratio must be greater than 0.46 for the money-to-gold multiplier to 
decrease post monopolisation. The currency-deposit ratio was about 
0.8 – well above the required value. Because rb and α decreased while 
g  increased, and since rcb remained stable, the required currency-
deposit ratio decreased even further over time. It is therefore highly 
































this was also what happened. Figure 3 shows the money-to-gold ratio 
of the Swedish banking system, 1875–1938.  
Figure 3 Money-to-gold ratio of the Swedish commercial banking system, 
1878–1938 
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
The money-to-gold ratio clearly decreased post monopolisation. Ex-
cept for the WWI period, the money-to-gold ratio was lower after 1904 
than it was during the note competition period.  
The credit multiplier  
It was argued that the credit capacity of the banking system was de-
termined by the reserve ratio of the commercial banks, and the size of 
the leakage of reserves that arises from a credit expansion. Hence, the 
credit capacity could be measured by the money multiplier. How-
ever, a third item is also of importance to the banks’ credit capacity, 
namely the public’s preferred time-demand deposit ratio. If the pub-
lic wants to hold more time deposits relative to demand deposits, 
then this would enhance the banks’ credit capacity, since less demand 
deposits means that less reserves are tied up. The money multiplier is 
therefore a valid measure of the credit capacity only under the as-
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Note Monopoly Note competition Transition  10
To see this, we calculate the “credit multiplier” in a note competi-
tive banking system, in the same way as we did with the money mul-
tiplier. From the balance sheet of Table 1 we see that  
C = I + T – R.                ( 1 7 )  
Define the time-demand deposit ratio t as  
D
T
t = .                  ( 1 8 )  
As was the case with c and r, t is treated as a behavioural constant. 













R T D N
G
C
         ( 1 9 )  
This multiplier will be compared to the one of note monopoly. When 
we form the credit multiplier for the note monopoly system, we as-
sume (realistically) that the central bank has no time deposits. The 
central bank’s credit is thus  
C = N + R – Rcb               ( 2 0 )  
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This is the same condition as the one that pertained to the MGM in (9). 
This means that an increase/decrease in the MGM means an equal 
increase/decrease in the CGM, and a sign that the credit capacity of 
the banking system has inceased/decreased. By observing a decreas-
ing money multiplier, we can predict that credit cycles should be-
come smaller. We can state the following:    11
Proposition: If the time-demand deposit ratio is constant, then 
a decrease in the money multiplier means a decrease in the 
credit multiplier, and hence a decrease in the credit capacity 
of the banking system.  
Unfortunately, the assumption of a constant time-demand deposit 
ratio is not warranted for the period in question. This is seen in Fig-
ure 4.  
Figure 4 Time-demand deposit-ratio, 1878–1938.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Note: 12 month moving average.  
Clearly, the time-demand deposit ratio increased after monopolisa-
tion, from levels around five in the competition period, to levels 
around seven in the monopoly period (except during WWI, when it 
dropped drastically). This represents a substantial increase in the 
credit multiplier. Calculating the multiplier in (21) with t equal to 5 
and 7 yields multiplier values of 20 and 26 – an increase of about 30 
percent.  
3  Money and credit cycles 1871–1938 
It was argued that if the central bank’s reserve ratio is larger than the 
reserve ratio of the commercial banks, and if the currency-deposit 
ratio is sufficiently large, then the total money multiplier (MGM) 















case. Further, if the premise is accepted that a smaller MGM is associ-
ated with smaller money cycles, then smaller cycles are to be ex-
pected after notes were monopolised by the Bank of Sweden in 1904. 
Further, the multiplier analysis showed that the smaller MGM should 
mean a smaller CGM and hence a smaller credit capacity of the bank-
ing system, wherefore smaller credit cycles are to be expected. How-
ever, the time-demand deposit ratio also increased, which increased 
the credit capacity of the banks. This effect increased the CGM by 
about 30 percent. Despite a decreasing money multiplier, credit cycles 
should therefore be expected to increase after monopolisation. Explic-
itly stated, the multiplier analysis yields the following two predic-
tions:  
Predictions:  Money cycles should have become smaller, and 
credit cycles larger, after notes were monopolised by the Bank of 
Sweden in 1904.  
These predictions are here confronted with Swedish bank data for the 
period 1871–1938. The amplitude of money and credit cycles before 
and after note monopolisation in 1904 is examined. The data are from 
the Summary of the Bank Reports [Sammanfattning af bankernas 
uppgifter]. These are data from the bank balance sheets collected by 
the Bank Supervisory Authority [Bankinspektionen]. For the Bank of 
Sweden there exists quarterly data for 1871–1877, and monthly data 
from January 1878. For the commercial banks there exists quarterly 
data for 1871–1874, and monthly data from March 1875. Since note 
monopoly was prescribed in the Bank Law of 1897 and the Bank of 
Sweden thereafter began to act like a central bank (for example by 
rediscounting bills of other banks, the period under study may be 
divided into three periods: a “note competition period” 1878–1897, a 
“transition period” 1897–1904, and a “note monopoly period” 1904–
1938.  
Problem of a small sample  
Because note monopolisation occurred in 1904, Sweden is fortunate in 
being one of few countries where it is possible to compare the relative 
performance of note competition versus note monopoly in the period 
of the classical gold standard. Unfortunately, there were only ten 
years with note monopoly before the demise of the classical gold   13
standard occurred in 1914 at the outbreak of WWI. The cycles sample 
is therefore very small. There are three cycles in the note competition 
period 1871–1897, one cycle in the transition period 1897–1904, and 
one cycle in the note monopoly period 1904–1914. Hence, there are no 
degrees of freedom left to control for external events, nor is it possible 
to perform statistical tests. To increase the sample for the note mo-
nopoly period, the data set is extended to the year 1938. Sweden re-
adopted the gold standard between April 1924 and September 1931. 
The extension brings one more cycle to the “note monopoly on gold”-
sample. For the sake of completeness, it is of value to document the 
entire series of money and credit cycles during the gold regime. An 
objection is that the interwar period in 1920–1939 is incommensurable 
with the pre-WWI period. Internationally, macro variables tended to 
fluctuate more in the interwar period compared to what they did be-
fore the war. This was the case also in Sweden (Englund et al. 1992). 
However, this fact would tend to weaken the value of the investiga-
tion if it was predicted that money and credit cycles unambiguously 
increased post monopolisation. In such a case, a discovered increase 
in cycle amplitudes could credibly be attributed to exogenous events 
rather than to a change in note regime. The problem here is some-
what more complicated, since it is predicted that money cycles 
should decrease. If this were found to be the case, the underlying the-
ory would be strengthened by a preconception of larger interwar 
volatility.   
The investigation should also be of value, since – to my knowl-
edge – it is the very first empirical study of how note monopoly af-
fects money and credit cycles.2 Although the material is insufficient 
for a final statement on the question of how note monopoly affects 
money and credit cycles, it should provide a valuable first word on it, 
perhaps providing groundwork for future comparisons of countries 
with and without note monopoly during the classical gold standard.   
Methodology  
                                                      
2 Some related studies are Ögren (2003), who investigate long-term trends in 
money and credit in Sweden 1834–1913, and Miron (1986) and Hortlund 
(2005), who study the seasonal effects of note monopolisation in the US and 
Sweden, respectively.     14
To measure cycle amplitude, moving averages (of logged variables) 
are used. Centred 12-month moving average (MA) series are used to 
filter out seasonal effects, and centred 8-year moving average series 
are used to filter out the trend component. An 8-year period is chosen 
because this was the approximate cycle length (from peak to peak) 
over the sample period (except during the exceptional circumstances 
in 1914–1924). Cycle amplitude is thus measured as follows:  
Cycle amplitude = 12 month MA – 8 year MA.  
Alternatively, cycles were also calculated for cycle periods of 7 and 9 
years. The results were not affected (available upon request).  
3.1 Money 
Two measures of money are examined: Notes and fiduciary money.  
Notes include all notes issued by the Bank of Sweden and the En-
skilda banks. Notes held by other banks as cash are included.   
Fiduciary money includes all demand liabilities used as means of 
payment, minus cash. Demand liabilities consist of notes, post bills and 
demand deposits held by the Bank of Sweden, the Enskilda banks 
and the Joint Stock banks. Cash includes gold, other coin, bank notes 
and, after January 1900, balances on giro accounts at the Bank of 
Sweden.  
The log of notes in 1871–1938 is presented in Figure 5. For the pe-
riod 1871–1878, quarterly data are used.    15
Figure 5 Log of notes of the Swedish banks, 1871–1938  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
There is a sharp increase in the volume of notes at the beginning of 
the period that peaks in March 1874. The peak coincides with a new 
bank law that prescribed that Enskilda bank notes could no longer be 
redeemed into Bank of Sweden notes, but only into gold coin. This 
stands in contrast to the situation before, when Bank of Sweden notes 
were legally equal to specie as a redemption medium. Before 1874, 
the Bank of Sweden notes were therefore legally base money to the 
Enskilda banks, and the Bank of Sweden had substantial power over 
the credit capacity of the banking system. The subsequent decrease in 
the note stock could reflect the diminishing reserve role of Bank of 
Sweden notes. There is then a sharp drop at the end of 1877. This 
drop could reflect imperfections in the data, particularly the transi-
tion from quarterly to monthly data in January 1878. The overall im-
pression is that note cycles did not increase after monopolisation, 
apart from the boom-bust episode of WWI. This is confirmed by Fig-
ure 6, which shows the cyclical component of logged notes for 1875–











Bank Law of 1974  16
Figure 6 Cyclical component of log of notes, 1875–1935 
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Note: WWI cycle excluded.  
The amplitude of the notes cycle did not increase after note monopo-
lisation. Apart from the first two cycles in the 1870s and early 1880s, 
the three cycles before, during and after transition have amplitudes 
that are more or less similar. The last cycle at the end of the gold stan-
dard period in 1931 is distinctly smaller.  
When it comes to fiduciary money, there is a clear tendency to-
wards smaller cycles post monopolisation. Figure 7 shows the log of 
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Figure 7 Log of fiduciary money, 1871–1938.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. 
The period 1904–1914 is particularly interesting. In this period, a 
large and sharp credit cycle occurred that peaked in 1907–1908, as 
will be seen below. But the graph for the stock of fiduciary money is 
virtually flat during this period. Figure 8 confirms that fiduciary 
money cycles became smaller after note monopolisation.  
 Figure 8 Cyclical component of log of fiduciary money, 1875–1935.  
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With regard to fiduciary money, the cycle became distinctly smaller 
post monopolisation.  
3.2 Credit   
Two measures of credit are studied: bills, and total lending (bills, cash 
credit and loans). Bills are worth looking at separately for three rea-
sons. First, as shown in Hortlund (2005), the discounting of bills was 
the main vehicle by which the commercial banks issued their notes. 
Second, bills were the most elastic form of credit and thus the most 
cyclical one. Third, the discount rate was the prime interest rate that 
was the benchmark for all other rates. Bills were thus the main in-
strument of monetary policy both before and after note monopolisa-
tion, until 1932 (when government bonds became the main instru-
ment). Figure 9 shows the log of total bank bills (commercial banks 
plus the Bank of Sweden) in 1871–1938.  
Figure 9 Log of total bank bills, 1871–1938.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. 
The volume of bills varied cyclically with remarkable regularity, par-
ticularly during the gold standard period. Calculation of the cyclical 
component indicates that the cycle amplitude increased after mo-
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Figure 10 Cycle amplitude for log of bank bills, 1875–1935 
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
In the competition period there is a steady downward trend in the 
cycle amplitude. Starting in the transition period, the trend turns up-
wards. Disregarding the first cycle of the competition period, the 
mean cycle amplitude of the monopoly period is larger than the one 
of the competition period. Compare the 1907–1908 bills cycle with the 
cycle of fiduciary media in the same period. Whereas the bills cycle is 
sharp, the fiduciary money cycle is virtually non-existent in this pe-
riod. Note also that the interwar cycle of 1931–1932 is smaller than the 
prewar cycle of 1907–1908.  
With regard to total lending, the trend towards larger cycles is 
even more manifest. Figure 11 pictures the log of total bank lending 
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Figure 11 Log of total bank lending, 1871–1938.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Note the strong seasonality in lending during the classical gold stan-
dard period. Lending cycles became larger after monopolisation, as 
Figure 12 shows.   
Figure 12 Cyclical component of the log of lending, 1875–1935  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
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4 Conclusions 
This paper investigated the quantitative effects of note monopolisa-
tion on money and credit cycles. In particular, it quantified the effects 
of leakage and clearing. Note monopolisation trades clearing for 
leakage. Loss of clearing causes a base expansion effect that increases 
the credit capacity of the banking system. By transforming currency 
into base money, monopolisation also installs leakage, which curbs 
the credit capacity. The relative magnitudes of these two effects were 
evaluated through an analysis of money multipliers. Three results 
were reached, the first one theoretical:  
1. If the central bank's reserve ratio is larger than the reserve ratio 
of the commercial banks, and if the currency-deposit ratio is suffi-
ciently large, then the total money multiplier will decrease post mo-
nopolisation.  
This was shown to be the case. If a smaller total multiplier is as-
sociated with smaller money and credit cycles, then, predictably, 
money and credit cycles should have decreased after monopolisation 
in 1904. However, with regard to credit, a smaller money multiplier 
will lead to smaller credit cycles only if the time-demand deposit ra-
tio is constant. Since this ratio increased post monopolisation, thus 
increasing the credit capacity of the banks, credit cycles should be 
expected to have increased post monopolisation. These two proposi-
tions were confronted with Swedish bank data for 1871–1938. The 
confrontation yielded the following results:  
2. With regard to money, the amplitude of the notes cycle slightly 
decreased after monopolisation, while the fiduciary-money cycle 
definitely became smaller, thus confirming predictions.   
3. With regard to credit, cycles became larger after monopolisa-
tion, thus confirming predictions.  
The multiplier analysis thus seems quite successful in explaining 
the effects of note monopolisation on money and credit cycles. The 
smallness of the sample is a problem. To what extent were changes in 
cycle amplitude due to the effects of note monopolisation? In particu-
lar, two external events potentially explain the incrementally larger 
credit cycle from 1890 to 1910. The period 1895–1910 was accompa-
nied by an international monetary boom; and there was a deep inter-  22
national crisis in 1907. It would therefore be of interest to compare 
money and credit cycles for countries with and without note monop-
oly in the period of the classical gold standard. Hopefully, this paper 
has provided some groundwork for such future studies.    23
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